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Abstract

This research project intends to use game theory to study penalty shootouts in soccer. Penalty
shootouts are a pivotal part of deciding the fate of soccer games. The Game Theory around a
penalty shootout involves two players who play an asymmetric, simultaneous, zero-sum game- a
game where players have different strategies to choose from. In addition, neither player knows
what the other player is going to do until they take their action. Using Python and Excel, the
research explores the descriptive and predictive analytics behind professional tournament penalty
shootouts. Additionally, Netlogo is utilized to create an agent-based model to perfonn
prescriptive analytics
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Introduction
Football, soccer, filtbol, all words that point to the beautiful game. A game that, at its core,
consists of two teams of eleven players moving a ball from one goal to the other trying to score
on the opposing team. The goal of the game is very simple, get the ball in the back of the
opposition's net. However, the game of soccer comes with its rules as well. When a player
breaks one of the sport's rules, they're penalized for their action. In front of the nets on a soccer
field, there is a large rectangular box called the eighteen-yard box. These two boxes are the areas
where a team's goalkeeper can pick up the ball. Moreover, if a player commits specific types of
fouls within the eighteen-yard box, it can result in a penalty kick. The ball is placed at the
penalty spot, a mark in the center of the net that is located twelve yards away from the goal-line.
A shooter then gets to take his shot on a goalkeeper standing in the net. This research project
intends to study soccer using game theory. Penalty shootouts are a pivotal part of deciding the
fate of soccer games. The Game Theory around a penalty shootout involves two players who
play an asymmetric, simultaneous game- that is a game with players who have different
strategies to choose from. In addition, neither player knows what the other player is going to do
until they take their action.
The Penalty Shot and Shootout
There are two different ways in which penalties can occur in the game of soccer. The first, as
mentioned above, are specific types of fouls that occur in the eighteen-yard box. These could
include examples such as players other than the goalie touching the ball with their hands in the
box, or a player aggressively and haphazardly challenging another player without contacting the
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ball. Beyond just fouls, there is also an event that occurs in some tournament style soccer
competitions called a penalty shootout. The penalty shootout begins after a game ends as a draw
in regular time, then another draw after extra-time. Teams desi gn ate a list of their I l players in
sequential order to take the pe'nalties. The players must already be on the field playing to take the
penalty. They cannot come from the substitutions bench unless they were substituted on the field
before the end of the game.
Behind Scoring a Penalty
In the cruel game of soccer, scoring a penalty can have virtually no pressure, or it can bear the
weight of an entire nation's World Cup dreams. From the words of former FIFA President,
Joseph Blatter, "When you go into extra time, we're talking about drama. But when we reach the
penalty shootout, it's a tragedy" (Quotes). A penalty can be more than game defining, but career
defining. Player's entire careers are marked by the events of one penalty shootout. Italy's
Roberto Baggio missed in the 1994 World Cup Final against Brazil after having a standout
tournament. He stated, "It affected me for years. It is the worst moment of my career. I still
dream about it. If 1 could erase a moment, it would be that one" (Quotes). The penalty shooter
generally experiences more pressure than the goalie, as they're always expected to score. The
goalie is attempting to cover an eight foot by twenty-four-foot net. Not only does the goalie have
to guess the right way, but they also must get to the shot in time. There is an obvious advantage
for shooters, it's the psychological drawbacks of taking the shot that truly affect the foiward.
From Doctor Ken Bray's book, "How to Score: Science and the Beautiful Game" mental focus is
a significant part of the penalty shot. In penalty shootouts, the goalkeeper in soccer has a "diving
envelope" that marks how far a goalie can truly make a penalty save (Bray). Ultimately, the
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shooter needs to make their shot outside of this diving envelope into the "unsaveable zone" to
ensure success with a penalty shot (Bray). These zones generally fall in the top two corners of
the net. However, losing mental focus could cause the best of players to miss the easiest of shots.
Behind Saving a Penalty

Former Italian National Team goalie and World Cup winner Gianluigi Buffon claimed, "I don't
think you can give anyone advice for penalty shootouts" ("Famous Quotes - Attacker Defender
Goalkeeper"). While in the previous section I stated that the goalie has less pressure, they
obviously still intend to make saves. A save can change the entire mood of a shootout and inspire
your own team's shooters. Most importantly, it can save a team from losing a shootout. While
goalies can study film of a player's shooting history, the nature of the game calls for the goalie to
psychologically affect the shooter. At the end of the day, the goalie can only try to affect the
shooter as best as possible. It is a game of luck for the goalie at times.
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Chapter 1: The Strategies
The model has two agents: the shooter, the agent taking the penalty shot and the goalie, the agent
attempting to prevent the shot from entering the net. The shooter has two decisions of striding
during his shot or changing his rate of pace. When a shooter strides during his shot, this
essentially signifies a run up to the penalty shot that has no change of pace. A shooter deciding to
change his pace during a penalty shot may do a variety of things such as: start at one pace, slow
for a moment, then complete his run up, stutter his entire run up or during a portion of his run up,
or any movement that would signify the shooter is delaying a run up. Using either of these
strategies could give the shooter an advantage or disadvantage when shooting. If a shooter
decides to change his rate of pace during a run up, they could potentially see the goalie step in a
direction before the shot, effectively giving away which direction would be optimal for the
shooter to go in. However, if the goalie manages to hold firm, the shooter could be thrown off
during his run up, as he still hasn't made a choice on which direction to shoot. Then, if a shooter
strides, generally they have their mind made up as to where exactly they want to go. They don't
gain the advantage of spoiling the goalie's decision to dive in a certain direction, but they are far
less likely to lose their confidence during their penalty run up.
Next, the goalkeeper has two strategies of holding on their line or coming off their line. In the
game of soccer, a goalie is always supposed to hold their line and keep both feet on the goal-line
until the shooter contacts the ball, however this rule was seldom enforced to the extent it should
be. With the recent introduction of VAR in many top leagues, this trend may change. More often,
a goalie's heel will at least come off their line during the shooter's last step up to the penalty
spot. Due to this, l define a goalie on their line and off their line in a different fashion. A goalie is
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considered to remain on her line if her foot doesn't touch the grass in front of the line before the
shooter contacts the ball. If the shooter's foot has already contacted the ball and the goalie has
either started diving or coming off his line, then the goalie would be considered off the line in the
model. The benefits of a goalie staying on the line is, a shooter would have more difficulty
reading where the goalie is going to dive during their run up. This can affect the shooter
psychologically, and significantly assist the goalie in making a save or causing the shooter to
miss. If a goalie comes off his line early, this helps a goalie dive to a side of the net faster, or
potentially cause the net to look smaller in the side of a forward's eye, but it can give away the
direction a goalie is planning to dive.
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Chapter 2: A Shot of the Data
Before building an agent-based model, it's necessary that I examine the data so that I understand
what's occurring in the observations. In PostgreSQL, I create a penalty dataset from penalty shot
observations by watching 464 penalty shots from various tournaments between the years 1990 to
2019. These shots came from club and national games from tournaments such as the Champions
League and the World Cup. The two strategies of either player listed above was recorded, and
the outcome of the shot was determined, whether it be a goal, save, or miss. For simplicity of the
model the modeler combined misses and saves of goalies together. Therefore, it's assumed that
the goalie's action causes the player to miss, while, a player could potentially have a bad shot.
The data was cleaned in Python, before being exported to Excel and pulled back into Python for
data analysis. Additionally, for the purpose of the project's analytics, I omit any missed shots.
The missed shots are not omitted in the Agent-based Model; however, results are needlessly
skewed if I include missed shots in the data analysis. Before removing misses from the data, the
results coincided with the average that a player has around a 73% chance of scoring in a penalty
shootout. It's found that in a shootout, players are less likely to score, as there is an 80% chance
that a shooter will score a penalty in the run of play (Bray).
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Goalkeeper
Left
Shooter

Middle

Right
Middle
127, 28% 1, 0%
44, 10% 8, 100%

Left
91,0%
28, 7%

Total:
219
80

Right

68, 0%

6,0%

91, 34%

165

Total:

239

15

210

464

Figure 1: Player Direction Count and save percentages (save
percentages exclude misses)
In Figure l's data, it's shown that there are generally more shots that navigate to the right of the
net. When considering that there are more right footed players than left footed players, this
makes sense as it's more natural for a right footed player to take their shot across the net. Goalies
also frequent the right side of the net more often. There could be a variety of factors that
influence this. Initially, one could consider the fact that there are more right footed shooters;
therefore, there is a higher likelihood the shot will go across the net. Secondly, goalies are more
likely to be right footed. This could cause a goalie to inherently dive to their right more often
than their left, as it's their preferred side. As for percentage saved per the direction of the
shooter, when a shooter shot left, 16.4% of his shots were saved. When a shooter chose to shoot
right, 18.9% of his shots were saved. Finally, when a shooter shoots straight down the middle,
18% of his shots are saved.
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Figure 2: Saved v Unsaved Shot Count
Ultimately, the data shows that 18. 97% of shots are saved in both international and club
competitions. This is lower than reported averages of chances saved, though I remind the reader
that the variable to miss has been omitted from these results. A decision matrix will be explained
later in the paper, indicating the chances of success for either player when both players guess the
same or separate direction.
Creating Logistic Regressions
The paper is particularly interested in with the data analysis is the effectiveness of direction
choices and strategies choices of both the goalkeeper and the shooter. I wish to find whether
certain decisions affect the total outcome of the penalty shot, and if it can, what is the ultimate
accuracy of predicting the outcome with the knowledge of these decisions. In order to truly
analyze these questions, multiple Logistic Regression Models are built in Python to find the
significance of the player's decisions.
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Logit
Psuedo R-squared: 0.039
Modal:
Loglt
703.1294
Dependent Variable:
Save is True
AIC:
BIC:
720.1601
No. Observations:
522
-347.S6
3
DfModel:
-361.82
518
Of Residuals:
•Villua:
2.B3E-06
5
No. lteraitons:
0.975
0.025
Variable
Coefficient Standard Error
0.1864
1.3841
0.3055
2.5700
0.7852
Shooter Direction Left
-1.5229
-0.4185
0.2B18
-3.4452
Goalie Direction Left
-0.9707
-0.6299
0.3099
-3.9928 0.0001 -1.8445
Shooter Direction Right -1.2372
2.1268
4.6740 0.0000 0.8701
1.4984
0.3206
Goalie Direction Right
Figure 3: Logistic Rearesslon l

In the most basic logistic regression in Figure 3, both shooter and goalie directions are included,
matching and separate. It can be noted that the shooter picking their direction has a positive
correlation on whether the save will be true, while the goalie's directions have the opposite
effect. It's interesting to see that when the left side of the net is picked, the side right footed
players are more comfortable shooting on, there is a lower coefficient than picking the opposite
side. This is surely a result of the higher frequency of shots being taken in that direction and
goalies diving in that direction- the chance of a save or a shot being successful decreases.
Logit

Logit
Psuedo R-squared:
Model:
Save is True
AIC:
Dependent Variable:
BIC:
No. Observations:
522
Log-Likelihood:
6
OfModel:
Lt-Null:
516
Of Residuals:
URp-value:
7
No. lteraltons:
z
10.025
Variable
Coefficient Standard Error
P>lzl
2.7287 0.0064 0.2596
0.3377
0.9215
Shooter Direction Left
-1.3808 0.1673 -1.0447
Goalie Direction Left
-0.4318
0.3127
-2.0731 0.0382 -1.4149
0.3508
Shooter Direction Right -0.7273
0.3549
4.39n 0.0000 0.8652
1.5609
Goalie Direction Right
-3.1935 0.0014 -0.9908
0.1923
-0.6140
Shot Height Bottom
Shot Hel ht Top
-6.4741 0.0000 -4.4999
-3.4542
0.5335
Fisure 4: Lo9istic Resression 2

0.191
599.788

629.5917
-292.89
-361.82
2.84E-27
0.975)

1.5833
0.1811
-0.0397
2.2565
-0.2372
-2.4084

Janeway 12

I then include the shooter's choice of shot height to the model in Figure 4. A shooter could shoot
at the bottom, middle, or top of the net. In the results, it's shown that as both the top and bottom
of the net are added to the Logit, the goalie's direction's sign ificances are affected. This would
make sense, as when a shot is taken to the top of the net, it's virtually unsavable. If a right footed
player decides to shoot towards the top, over 50% of the time he will take this shot to the left
side of the net, his more comfortable side. This observation provides explanation as to why the
goalie choosing to dive to the left (right side of the net) would lower in significance, as this
decision has less impact on a shot being saved.
Logit
Model:

Logit

Dependent Variable:
No. Observations:

Save is True

Psuedo R•squared:

AIC:

522
BIC:
Log-Likelihood:
Of Model:
6
LL-Null:
Of Residuals:
515
7
No. lteraitons:
LLR p-value:
Variable
z
(0.025
Coefficient Standard Error
P>lzl
4.5112 0.0000 0.9166
Shooter Direction Left
0.3593
1.6208
Goalie Direction Left
0.3988
-3.6967 0.0002 -2.2559
-1.4743
Shooter Direction Right
Goalie Direction Right
Shot Height Bottom
Shot Height Top
International Match

-0.6170
-3.6564
-1.3144
1.0544
0.9244

0.1955
0.5426
0.3654
0.3428
0,2189

-3.1569
-6.7387
-3.3239
3.0761
4.2227

0.0016
0.0000
0.0009
0.0021
0.0000

-1.0001
-4.7198
-1.9306
0.3826
0.4953

0.191
599.788
629.5917
-292.89
-361.82
2.84E-27
0.975]

2.3250
•0,6926
-0.2339
-2.5929
-0.4983
1.7263
1.3534

Figure 5: Logistic Regression 3

Finally, the most accurate model at 70% in an accuracy report, Figure 6, actually comes when
international matches are introduced to the Logit. When a match is international, it increases the
likelihood of a shot being saved significantly. In other penalty data observations, data analyses
generally find that there is a higher probability of a shooter not scoring a goal in international
matches than club matches. This makes sense, for players have more pyschological weight on
their shoulders in these penalty shootouts. Their countries are on their back, so their level of

•
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quality can falter. Additionally, the skill level of international players can vary greatly. Players
on international teams can be from a club of any division and any country. In club level penalty
shootouts, the skill level of players is generally closer.

Reco1ver operating characterishc

0.6

l
- Logistic Regression (urea " 0 70)

0.0 w_________
0.0

0.2

0,4

0.6

False Positive Rate

0.8

1,0

Figure 6: ROC Curve of Regression 3
Python is used to produce an ROC curve that plots the true positive rate against the false positive
rate, essentially informing the reader how well the model distinguishes between classes. lt
displays that the classifier tends to stray away from the random classifier model, bar the
intersection in the beginning. Our degree of separability from the classifier is 70%, indicating
that the model is a fair test of the data.

Precision Recall
Fl-Score Support
86
0
0.72
0.72
0.72
1
0.66
0.66
0.66
71
Figure 7: Decision Matrix of Logit 3
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A decision matrix is also created in Python with key points to observe: Precision and Recall.
Precision is the positive predictive value, producing the fraction of relevant instances to the
model from the instances observed. Then, recall, or sensitivity, is the fraction of relevant
instances in the model that are utilized. The goalie and shooter strategies of coming off their line
and stuttering or striding is generally an insignificant variable. While this won't prevent the
creation of an agent-based model of the data, this does ask questions as to whether either strategy
truly makes an impact in the game of soccer. When the goalie-shooter decision matrix is shown
later in the paper, the reader will notice the varying margins of difference it makes when these
decisions are altered. However, one could make an argument that these strategies may cause
shooters to miss more often, so the data would need to be examined further to make ultimate
conclusions regarding the strategy's overall si gn ificance.
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Chapter 3: Building an Agent-based Model

It's mentioned earlier how the shooter and goalie are allotted different decisions during each
penalty shootout. This model intends to see the effectiveness of these decisions in an agent-based
simulation. In the model, the shooter and goalie both pick a direction to go. The direction is
chosen randomly in the model, left, middle, right. If the two agents pick the same direction, then
the chances of saving go up for the goalie. The data inputted into these chances are in the
empirical results section.
As it normally works with professional players, when they find a strategy, they make it their
staple. A shooter will generally carry on with the same strategy for his entire career, as he has
perfected this strategy more than the any other. Every round, the shooter and goalie have a base
80% chance of remaining with the strategy that the program predetermined them to have fi-om
the beginning. This percentage is decreased every following round that they fail to either make a
save or score, increasing the likelihood of them changing their action against the opposing
player. This would make sense if two players have shot and saved against one another for the last
couple years, as they imagine that their opposition will become accustomed to their regular style.
Later in the model, the base chance of remaining with one's strategy is lowered to see the
consequences of a more unpredictable goalie and shooter.
Adding Nervousness and Player Skill

Our simple model merely shows shooters and goalies making decisions based on a prior round,
and the luck of the draw of the goalie picking the same direction as the shooter. To improve the
model, the elements of nervousness and skill are added to the shooter. While these could be
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added to the goalie as well, I feel as though its far more realistic that a shooter wi11 suffer from
nervousness and his skill will be tested as a result. In this new model, the shooter of the five
rounds is pre-detennined to have a shooting skill between O and 9 and a nervousness gauge
between O and 9. The shooting skill adds its value to the chance to score variable of the shooter.
The nervousness gauge, on the other hand, subtracts from the chance to score for a shooter. In
addition, the nervousness variable can increase or decrease. If the shooter's shot is blocked or he
missed, there is a 20% chance that he will gain one more point of nervousness (not exceeding 9).
The opposite is true if he scores, simulating a loss of or increase in confidence.
On-llne Stride
Goalkeeper

Shooter

Right
Middle
Left
left
.607, .393 .865, .135 .865 , .135
.783, .217 Shooter
0, 1
Middle .783, .217
Right .865, .135 .865, .135 .607, .393
Off-line Stride

On-llne Stutter
Goalkeeper

Right
Middle
Left
.558, .442 .694, .306 .694, .306
left
.5,.5
.5, .5
0, 1
Middle
Right .694, .306 .694, .306 .558, .442
Off-line Stutter

Goalkeeper

Middle
Left
Right
.566, .434 .833, .117 .833, .117
Middle .917, .083
0, 1
.917, .083 Shooter
Right .883, .117 .883, .117 .566, .434
Left

Shooter

Goalkeeper

Right
Middle
Left
.595, .405 .994, .060 .994, .060
Middle .841, .159
o, 1
.841, .159
Right .994, .060 .994, .060 .595, .405
Left

Figure 8 Decl1lon Matrb1 Shooter and Goalie

Adding and decreasing volatility in player's strategies
Finally, to finish the model, the variability of the two agents changing their strategies is
increased. An agent's percentage chance to change their strategy is changed from 20% to 100%
in the model. As expected, goalies had a higher probability to make a save the less variability
there was in the two changing their strategies. There was a 4.48% saving percentage margin
between 0% variability and 100% variability for goalkeepers.
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A Sequential Game

After the options of running a simultaneous game are exhausted, the model is shifted to consider
the effects of running the game sequentially. In this model, the goalie picks their strategy based
on the shooter's. If the shooter starts her run up stuttering, the goalie will naturally decide to stay
on their line, as this drastically improves the goalie's chance of saving. Vice versa, the goalie
will choose to come off his line if the shooter performs a normal run up to the ball. This comes
with some flaws. If the goalie tries to predict the strategy of a shooter who is planning on
stuttering, they could get caught off-line early. Some shooters will hold their stutter until their
last step of their run up to the ball.
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results

Using the same data described in Chapter 2, the results that are entered to the model involve
goalies staying on their line or coming off and shooters striding or stuttering. If the two agents
both choose the middle, it's assumed that the goalie will always save regardless of both agent's
strategies. For goalies who stay on their line, if the forward strides and both agents choose the
same direction, they have a 39.3% chance of saving or causing them to miss. If the shooter
decides to go down the middle while the goalie chooses a direction to dive, there is a 21. 7% of
the goalie making a save or the shooter missing. Finally, if the two players choose opposite
directions, there is a 13.5% chance of the shooter missing. Again, for goalies who stay on their
line, I'll also look at if the forward stutters. If both agents pick the same direction, the goalie has
a 44.2% chance of saving or causing them to miss. Shooting down the middle while the goalie
dives left or right, there is a 50.0% of the goalie making a save or the shooter missing. Finally,
opposite directions, there is a 30.6% chance of the shooter missing. Then, for goalies who come
off their line, if the forward strides and both agents choose the same direction, they have a 43.4%
chance of saving or causing them to miss. If the shooter decides to go down the middle while the
goalie chooses a direction to dive, there is an 8.3% of the goalie making a save or the shooter
missing. Therefore, if the two players choose opposite directions, there is a 11. 7% chance of the
shooter missing. Again, for goalies who stay on their line, I'll also look at if the forward stutters.
If both agents pick the same direction, the goalie has a 40.5% chance of saving or causing them
to miss. Shooting down the middle while the goalie dives left or right, there is a 15.9% of the
goalie making a save or the shooter missing. Finally, taking opposite directions, there is a 6.0%
chance of the shooter missing. All this data is collected in a Figure S's decision matrix.

Janeway 19

01��1 EJ
1� 9r•tVY I [�J 1�-· I
Fl1ure 9 Mod•I 1howln1 th• lnt•rf•c• for our N•tlo10 GUI where the cow Is • ahriotar and th• 10•11• 11 • 1ho1t

Something should be noted about the simulation. Using the agent-based model, I combine both
left footed players and right footed player's shots. While it's more realistic to separate the two,
the modeler did not feel as though there were enough left footed observations to support a
separate model. This ties into Figure S's Decision matrix in that- right footed players are more
accurate shooting to the left, while left footed players are more accurate shooting to the right
(Spaniel). I solve this problem by accepting the overall percentage average for missing by either
footed player.
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Chapter S: Results

In the model, a NetLogo Behavior Space tracking 10000 iterations of the penalty shootout
between two players is created. The penalty shootout between the two players would go for five
shots, then it would move forward to the next penalty scenario. In Excel, I manage to find that
the shooter will have a goalscoring average of 3.47 while the goalie will average 1.53 saves in
the most basic model. These numbers may seem a bit strange off first glance, but after dissecting
the nature of the model, they begin to make more sense.
It's impossible for the simple model to consider the stress of taking a penalty, moreover, the
stress of taking a penalty against a goalie you have played multiple times. This being the case, an
agent who can't necessarily feel "stress" would systematically take and run with the perfection of
a mathematical model spouting out the chance of a goalie making a save or causing the shooter
to miss. With the model adding the element of either agent's potential of changing their strategy
to increase if their current strategy isn't working, the model finds very similar numbers to real
empirical results of a goalie and a forward facing one another multiple times. Finding a goalie
and forward who have played one another five times can be rare, however of the scenarios the
model shows, the goalies had a 28.8% save percentage. This is comparable to the 30.20%
average of the model. When the functionality of nervousness and player skill are added to the
model, it's found that the goalie's save percentage increases to 30.8%, a .6% increase from a lack
of these variables. While the save percentage increases, it's hardly significant. Finally, in a
sequential model in which the goalkeeper reads the shooter's strategy and makes his decision
based on it, the save percentage increases to 34.4% while the score percentage drops to 65.6%.
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Conclusion

This project leaves open several directions to be developed in the Game Theory of the Penalty
Shootout. A model has been developed that effectively simulates near real-world results of
penalty takers and goalkeeper's results from a penalty situation with the variation of strategies
changing based on agent memory of the past encounter. The modeler would improve on this
project by, first off, acquiring more empirical data for his model. He would like to have I 000
penalty shots from leagues across the world. A huge problem with finding players with five
penalties between them is most public data sources only display the players outside of penalty
shootouts. The modeler collected all his empirical data from shootouts, so it's obvious to see the
fallacy in this. In addition, the modeler would use a board of individuals familiar with the sport
to judge the strategies and directions of the goalies and shooters.
I played soccer for years, acting as a goalie all the way into the collegiate level. The penalty
shootout is just as nerve-wracking as it is exciting. Quantifying it down to the numbers doesn't
necessarily tell the entire story, though I did take away a few major points. Firstly, the impact
that national games has on penalty shootouts is quite high. In hindsight, it makes sense that
representing a nation would be a stressful ordeal, though this could really improve a goalie's
confidence. They understand that the average confidence of a striker is low in these scenarios.
Secondly, a player shouldn't pick the middle, they should do that every time. Out of the
observations, it seemed like a player didn't have to necessarily strike the ball with a ton of power
to ensure a top height shot would go in. The amount of saves at this height were miniscule as
well. Additionally, it's more difficult for a tall, top level keeper to get to the ground. Goalies are
naturally going to be at a middle height when diving, and a player could take advantage of
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aiming high or low. Finally, it's difficult to quantify the thought-process of a shooter.
Determining where a shooter was aiming originally is impossible. I would like to take more time
to solve this problem, potentially acquiring my own data of shooters choosing an individual spot
and seeing how often they could hit the spot they pick out.
Finally, more attention would be given to the agent-based computation portion of the model. The
model develops a very basic memory function for the agents that allows them to change their
decisions based on an experience. A future model would allow the shooter agent to have taken
ten shots between each shot with the goalie agent, and vice versa for the goalie's save decisions.
Therefore, the goalie could utilize this information in his decision making for the next shot he's
facing against the shooter, and vice versa for the shooter agent. This makes sense because
usually goalies and shooters will only see one another twice a year, so normally there will be
many penalty shots between these periods. Ultimately, to have a model that nearly replicates
real-world empirical results is a very exciting first step. Data acquisition and time are the two
biggest constraints on the final product of this project.
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Appendix: Teams Observed and Number of Observations
Observations
Team
Observartions
Team
4
Bayeru Munich
9
APOEL
Iran
1
Costa Rica
10
Al2eria
4
Atletic Bilbao
6
4
Chile
Atletico Madrid
15
27
Italy
Ivory Coast
3
France
14
Real Madrid
8
13
Sevilla
10
Lyon
9
Ghana
Benfica
4
Iceland
2
8
Ireland
4
Yugoslavia
Germany
21
Japan
4
Portugal
14
4
South Korea
5
Columbia
4
Bayer Leverlnisen
Denmark
5
5
Chelsea
Eintracht Frankfurt
9
3
Turkey
2
Saudi Arabia
1
NiJ!;eria
Ukraine
4
9
Everton
.Araentina
21
6
Switzerland
En�land
24
Greece
West Ham
10
4

Team
Observations
4
Uruguay
9
Russia
12
Netherlands
Romania
11
Paraguay
5
7
PSV
15
Brazil
Australia
2
21
Spain
4
Bulgaria
Croatia
14
Tunisia
6
6
Bele:ium
Mexico
7
4
Liveroool
9
Poland
Besil.."tas
11
7
Sweden
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